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DSpace issue2: EPerson byEmail Search Leaks Account Authorization Properties

Vulnerability call chain

1.1 Summary

DSpace has a missing authorization vulnerability: EPerson byEmail Search Leaks Account Authorization Properties. Unauthorized disclosure of EPerson account attributes including email, netid, canLogIn, requireCertificate, selfRegistered, and lastActive. These are authorization/authentication-related properties, especially netid and login flags

  • Attack precondition: The attacker can call GET /api/eperson/epersons/search/byEmail and knows or guesses a target email address
  • Security impact: Unauthorized disclosure of EPerson account attributes including email, netid, canLogIn, requireCertificate, selfRegistered, and lastActive. These are authorization/authentication-related properties, especially netid and login flags

1.2 Exploit path

GET /api/eperson/epersons/search/byEmail?email=<target> calls findByEmail() without method-level @PreAuthorize. The result is converted to EPersonRest, exposing account fields that normally require EPERSON READ via the direct findOne endpoint

1.3 Key code evidence

  1. EPersonRestRepository.java

Evidence location: EPersonRestRepository.java
2. EPersonConverter.java

Evidence location: EPersonConverter.java
3. EPersonRestPermissionEvaluatorPlugin.java

Evidence location: EPersonRestPermissionEvaluatorPlugin.java

3. Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause 1: Missing server-side authorization on the vulnerable operation.

The endpoint accepts user-controlled authorization-sensitive identifiers or fields, but the write/read path does not prove that the current caller may operate on the target object.

Root Cause 2: Missing object-scope or grant-bound validation.

The implementation relies on endpoint access, UI filtering, or object existence checks instead of enforcing target ownership, tenant boundary, role ceiling, or grantable-resource constraints at the service layer.

Add @PreAuthorize("hasPermission(#email, 'EPERSON', 'READ')") equivalent logic after resolving the target EPerson, or restrict byEmail to admin / self and return a minimized response for other users

5. Verification after fix

  • Unauthorized callers receive HTTP 403 or equivalent rejection.
  • Out-of-scope target identifiers are rejected before database writes or sensitive reads.
  • Role, permission, tenant, organization, ownership, or grant-bound ceilings are enforced server-side.
  • Direct HTTP requests are rejected even when front-end controls are hidden.
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